Part Three of Notes on Kant's Critique of Judgment Analysis pertaining to selections from Kant's Critique of Judgment, including: Intro. III-IV, Ana Beautiful §§ 1-8, 10-1, 14, 17-20, 22; Ana Sublime §§ 23, 25, 28, 31-7, Remark, §§47-9, 56-7, 59, collected in Art and its Significance, ed. Ross, pp.93-142. Contents: I) On Kant (cf. Part One Notes) II) On Kant’s Philosophy (cf. Part One Notes) III) On Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (cf., Ross, pp.95-8) (cf. Part One Notes) IV) Textual Analysis: On The Analytic of the Beautiful (cf., Ross, pp.98-113) (cf. Part Two Notes) V) Textual Analysis: On The Analytic of the Sublime (cf., Ross, pp.113-27) (cf. Here ... Below ...) V) Textual Analysis: On The Analytic of the Sublime, §§23-29 (cf., Ross 113-27) Read in Conjunction with “Second Book: Analytic of the Sublime,” in Ross, pp. 113-27. (Note ... notes currently refer to two translations: Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. John H. Bernard (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2007). How the Critical Project led to the 3rd Critique: Kant’s critical project hinges upon a synthesis of experience and reason as the origin of knowledge and as that which grants knowledge its limits. That is, all knowledge comes from sensibility (in which objects are given and which yields intuitions) and understanding (in which objects are thought and which yields concepts). So, knowledge comes from experience that is experienced through rational, innate, a priori structures (space and time and the table of categories). This is how understanding works. The problem that we run into is when we want to know something that we cannot experience, this Kant calls Reason, rather than Understanding, and it happens in metaphysics (on cosmological, theological, and psychological questions). So, in Understanding, judgments are determinate (has concept to subsume particulars under). In Reason, judgments are reflective (has no full concept). So, how does Judgment judge without a concept? Does Reflective Judgment give itself an a priori principle? In a way, yes—it gives itself an a priori principle via Reason of the Purposiveness of Nature (although, we may also properly say that all four moments of the beautiful, the disinterest, universality, purposivity, and necessity form this principle), which can be represented via Aesthetic or Teleological Judgments. (But, we answer the question as saying yes, in a way, because we can also answer no, not entirely, because Kant’s Introduction implies that indeterminate judgments, wherein the judger must come up with a new concept by which to judge, are somewhat different than teleological and aesthetic judgments, wherein we judge according to other, related but not entirely applicable concepts in the former and that we judge without forming a new concept, but act as if we have a concept in the latter). Aesthetic Judgments: concern the accordance of Form (related by imagination) to the Faculties of Desire wherein Form is considered a ground of pleasure from the representation. Teleological Judgments: Accordance of Form with the possibility of the thing-itself; the Thing is represented by form to be fulfilling an End/Purpose of nature. The a priori regulative concept of Purposiveness connects nature (1st Critique) with freedom (2nd Critique). And, according to Lyotard, in his Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), “The task assigned to the Critique of Judgment, as its Introduction makes explicit, is to restore unity to philosophy in the wake of the severe ‘division’ inflicted upon it by the first two Critiques” (1). Most scholars, as Lyotard points out, and perhaps Kant himself, seeing the success of the 3rd Critique’s synthesis of the former two as residing in the latter half of the text: the teleology. This reading, as Lyotard explains it, runs thus: … taste at least, if not the feeling of the sublime, offers the paradox of a judgment that appears, problematically, to be doomed to particularity and contingency. However, the analytic of taste restores to judgment a universality, a finality, and a necessity—all of which are, indeed, subjective—merely by evincing its status as reflective judgment. This status is then applied to teleological judgment in order, precisely, to legitimate its use. In this way, the validation of subjective pleasure serves to introduce a validation of natural teleology (ibid., 1). This argument seems wholly valid because of Kant’s determination that the judgment is simply reflective—that is, “The ‘weakness’ of reflection this also constitutes its ‘strength’” (ibid., 2) because reflection is a process of reunification wherein it finds the universal from the given particulars; it has no principle per se (which could legislate) by which to judge, but it is allowed a principle peculiar to itself by which laws are sought. Its weakness is manifest in its principle being “merely subjective a priori” (Kant, 15; 12); it does not determine objects, that is a task for understanding for matters of the world and for reason for matters of freedom. Instead, it judges objects as given, in their particularity; it judges them as if the rules that determined their possibility a priori were insufficient to account for their particularity thereby permitting its activity to be a seeking further for their universality from their existence, not possibility (Lyotard, 2). This principle by which it judges is transcendental; it is subjective; it is from itself and given to itself. This principle can only be applied with art. The results we take from this investigation can then be analogically applied to teleology, but Kant could not have skipped the opening half on the aesthetic, for from teleology alone, he cannot get anywhere. As Kant ends his Introduction, “A critique [of the judging subject] … is the propaedeutic of all philosophy.” Were this implication not strong enough, that the critique of judgment is preparatory for all philosophy, and teleology can only follow aesthetics, Lyotard underlines his reading: “I would argue that an importance of an entirely different order may be accorded the ‘Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment,’ that of being a propaedeutic that is itself, perhaps, all of philosophy (for ‘we can at most only learn how to philosophize …,’ but we cannot learn philosophy (krv, 657, t.m.’ 752) …. Aesthetic judgment conceals, I would suggest, a secret more important than that of doctrine, the secret of the ‘manner’ (rather than the method) in which critical thought proceeds in general” (Lyotard, 6). What is this “manner?”—The manner, the “modus aestheticus,” is the feeling of unity in the presentation. What is this “method?”—the method, “modus logicus,” follows definite principles. Fine art has only manner; it has no method. Stripped of function, reflection (in these aesthetic judgments) has no claim to knowledge, it seeks only its own pleasure, it has nothing other than itself to pursue, thus, it perpetuates itself: the contemplation of the beautiful reproduces itself, strengthens itself, reproduces itself. It is a lingering that makes the mind passive, but it has its own activity herein in the self-perpetuation. It must linger; it is feeling that orients it. It is subjective, and yet it is autonomous. Analytic of the Sublime Summary: The free play of the imagination, in the estimation of the Beautiful, offers us a taste of ambrosia, it pleases. In the Sublime, the imagination, that which receives the presentation, offers us awe. Awe can be magnificent and pleasing, or it can be capable of producing in us something like fear. While the Beautiful deals with the form, with limits, the Sublime deals with the formless, the limitless. The Beautiful prompts us to admire quality, the Sublime, quantity. The Sublime plunges us into a state where our metal capacities are compromised. We are struck by formless, limitless magnitude. There is tremendous pleasure here, but it only indirectly arises from this blinded amazement into which we are rendered. We cannot remain scared of this feeling that arises in us, we must regain our reason, and then we see the Sublime as wondrous. There is repulsion and attraction; its satisfaction is not negated, but transformed into negative pleasure. This dual movement of repulsion and attraction demonstrates the sublime does have a subjective purposiveness. Purposiveness will become the a priori principle (akin to space and time and the categories in the 1st Critique) from Reason that permits reflective judgment judge without a concept (that is, since the aesthetic is not a cognitive judgment, lacks concepts, how could it function, by what fixed lines would it judge anything?); this purposiveness of Nature can be represented through aesthetic (and teleological) judgments. To be able to think the totality of infinity demands a faculty in the mind that is supersensible; we can think the totality by indirection shown through our failure to think it. It is aesthetic estimation of magnitude that tries to comprehend that which exceeds the capacity of the imagination to comprehend. §23 Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to that which judges of the Sublime Commonalities between the beautiful and sublime: (1) both please in themselves (yield mere, indeterminate satisfaction) (2) neither are a judgment of sense (3) neither are a logically determined judgment (4) both are a judgment of reflection (5) their satisfaction depends neither upon sensation (as in pleasant) nor concept (as in good) (6) neither yield knowledge, but only feeling of pleasure (7) both singular, yet universal judgments (8) both employ imagination in accord with and furthers the faculty of concepts in Understanding and Reason Differences between the beautiful and sublime: (1) Beautiful: concerned with form of the object, has boundaries Sublime: concerned with the formless, shows no boundaries yet invokes totality (2) Beautiful: presentation of an indefinite concept of the Understanding Sublime: presentation of an indefinite concept of Reason (3) Beautiful: satisfaction bound up with quality Sublime: satisfaction bound up with quantity (4) Beautiful: positive pleasure—pleasure directly tied to furtherance of life; compatible with charms and play of imagination (freies Spiel) Sublime: negative pleasure—pleasure had indirectly through its challenge to our vital powers and our conquering this challenge; compatible with the exercise of imagination, which is antithesis to the free play of imagination (5) Beautiful: natural beauty has purposiveness in its form, which makes the object seem to be pre-adapted to our judgment Sublime: seems to violate purpose in judgment, that is, it seems to be vehemently unsuitable for our capacity to judge and to do violence to imagination—and, from this, it is yet judged to be even more perfectly sublime (he seems to say no purposiveness, but in §26, he affirms it does have such) An object of nature, most properly speaking, is not sublime. Objects of nature may be beautiful. The “sublime object” is an object fit to receive the presentation of a sublimity where the sublimity is actually found in the mind. No sensible form can properly contain the sublime. (but, this is only strictly speaking… we speak of sublime things and events, but this is how we speak… the sublime is the judgment in our minds) [Sublimity is in the mind, not in an object, properly. The sublime…] “This concerns only Ideas of the Reason, which, although no adequate presentation is possible for them, by this inadequacy that admits of sensible presentation, are aroused and summoned into the mind. Thus the wide ocean, agitated by the storm, cannot be called sublime. Its aspect is horrible; and the mind must be already filled with manifold Ideas if it is to be determined by such an intuition to a feeling itself sublime, as it is incited to abandon sensibility and to busy itself with Ideas that involve higher purposiveness” (§23, p.62). (6) Beautiful: has purposiveness (in nature and art) that extends our concept of nature (not our cognition of natural objects) Sublime: lacks this extending aspect that leads one to objective principles and their corresponding forms in nature… instead, more so, nature excites ideas of sublime the most in its greatest chaos (p.63) (Again, he seems to say sublime has no purposiveness, but in §26, he affirms it does have such) (7) Beautiful: its study is more important because its purposiveness leads us to seek an external ground (after the internal presentation of the representation to Reason through imagination) (it is form that is the ground of pleasure in presentations) Sublime: its study is a “mere appendix to the aesthetical judging” because it does not lead to any presentation of form in nature beyond itself, it leads us only back to an inner ground within ourselves to find its cause (p.63) §24 Of the Divisions of an Investigation into the Feeling of the Sublime The study of the sublime necessitates the other moments of the aesthetic judgment of the beautiful, that is: Quantity: universally valid Quality: disinterested Relation: subjective purposiveness Modality: necessity Note, he is linking the four moments of the judgment of taste with The Categories (these are developed in his Critique of Pure Reason as the a priori structures through which we think what sensibility gives us; these are much like those established in Aristotle’s Categories, those ways by which we know and can classify a thing). The beautiful approaches the object with disinterest; its judgment presupposes and maintains the mind in a state of restfulness. The sublime brings us a movement of the mind in its judgment of the object we see as sublime (cf. §27 for more in-depth analysis). This movement is subjectively purposive (it is ours and b/c the sublime pleases), and is referred to the faculty of cognition or the faculty of desire through imagination (p.64). Note, he seems to contradict his earlier claims of its lack of purposiveness and that aesthetic judgments refer the object to the faculty of desire through imagination, not that of cognition. Why? Because he is establishing a TWO-FOLD way of REPRESENTING THE SUBLIME: He states that, unlike as in the Beautiful, we must differentiate: The Mathematically Sublime: The Dynamically Sublime: ******* Without these 12 pure concepts of understanding an object would merely be felt, not understood. Aristotle’s list within his Categories was determined by Kant to be “incomplete” because it lacked a transcendental. Kant’s transcendental is the Power-to-Judge (Vermögen-zu-Urteilen: to have the power to judge); this is a “community principle,” the power to think, a unity of the four moments wherein the community is Denken—that is, this power is the same as the power to think. Thinking lies at the basis of the table of categories and the aesthetic (note, though, thinking is different from logos). The table of categories assists Kant to create the four moments of taste of the beautiful, but, like it is in the 1st Critique, the Table of Categories is only applicable in their application, not in themselves, i.e., they are structures, not faculties or powers. A.—Of the Mathematically Sublime: §25 Explanation of the term ‘sublime’ “We call sublime that which is absolutely great.” “Great” and “magnitude” are different concepts. Great: Something that is absolutely great is “… that which is great beyond all comparison.” It is not a pure concept of the understanding, not an intuition of sense, and not a concept of reason because it does not bring a principle of cognition with it. Magnitude: “That something is a magnitude may be cognized from the thing itself, without any comparison with another … But how great it is always requires something else, which is also a magnitude as its measure … [thus a] concept of magnitude … can afford at best only a comparative concept. Now, if I simply say that something is great, it seems that I do not have in mind any comparison at all, at least not with any objective measure …” “Great” judgments still demand everyone’s assent (they are universal, despite being subjective). “… this judgment is certainly grounded on a standard that one presupposes can be assumed to be the same for everyone, but which is not useable for any logical (mathematically determinate) judging of magnitude, but only for an aesthetic one, since it is a merely subjective standard grounding the reflecting judgment on magnitude.” We still do not have any interest in the existence of the object (because it is not like a judgment of the pleasant or good); even if a magnitude, it is formless, but it can bring a satisfaction that is universally communicable. This satisfaction is NOT in the object (as it is for the Beautiful), but in the enlargement of the imagination in itself. The sublime is more than great; it is great beyond all comparison. Thus, the standard for it is NOT outside it, but within it, a magnitude equal only to itself. Sublime, thus cannot be found in nature, but only in our ideas. That which is sublime makes, in comparison, everything else small. Nothing that is an object of our senses can be sublime. It is the disposition of the mind, not the thing, that is sublime. “That is sublime which even to be able to think of demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure of the senses.” §26: “On the Estimation of the Magnitude of Things of Nature that is Requisite for the Idea of the Sublime” “The estimation of magnitude by means of numerical concepts (or their signs in algebra) is mathematical, but that in mere intuition (measured by eye) is aesthetic.” All estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature is aesthetic (subjectively, not objectively, determined). The aesthetic thing that is judged to be the greatest, then, brings forth the feeling of the sublime. If an example of the Sublime is to be given, it CANNOT come from products of ART where the human end determines the form and magnitude, nor from NATURAL THINGS with their own determination/end, but it can only be in “RAW NATURE” and only insofar as this brings neither charm nor emotion from real danger, merely insofar as it contains magnitude (this, however, does seem to contradict what he has said before in §23 and what he will say in §52). “Raw Nature,” that is, which contains nothing Monstrous or Colossal [Monstrous: by its magnitude it annihilates the end, which its concept constitutes. Colossal: mere presentation of a concept too great for all presentation, too big for apprehension]. No purposiveness of the form of the object (as it is for Beautiful) is the basis for judging sublime. Nevertheless, the sublime has a purposiveness, so what is it? It is subjective purposiveness. The imagination advances to infinity by itself, the understanding guides this, however, by numerical concepts, for which the imagination provides the schema. This is also intentional purposiveness: we think this magnitude in numbers and in totality. To be able to think the totality of infinity demands a faculty in the mind that is supersensible. It is aesthetic estimation of magnitude that tries to comprehend that which exceeds the capacity of the imagination to comprehend. “Thus, as the aesthetic power of judgment in judging the Beautiful relates the imagination it is free play to the understanding, in order to agree with its concepts in general (without determination of them), so in judging a thing to be sublime the same faculty is related to reason, in order to correspond subjectively with its ideas (through which is undetermined), i.e. in order to produce a disposition of the mind which is in conformity with them and compatible with that which the influence of determinate (practical) ideas on feeling would produce.” §27 Of the Quality of the Satisfaction in our Judgments upon the Sublime “The feeling of our incapacity to attain and Ideas, which is a law for us, is respect” (§27, p.71) Reason suggests that we can comprehend every phenomenon that can be given in intuition; Imagination exerts the greatest effort, but confronts its own limitations and inadequacies when it tries to comprehend a whole, but, at the same time, it shows its destination is to make itself adequate to this Idea of Reason (total comprehension). This is the invocation of respect. The pleasure in the sublime “is respect from our own destination, which by a certain subreption we attribute to an Object of nature (conversion of respect from the Idea of humanity in our own subject into respect for the Object)” (§27, p.71). That is, our attraction/repulsion to the sublime elicits a feeling of respect that is really for our ability to strive after and conquer the idea and think it, although we attribute it to the thing itself. There is an oscillation of pain from the unthinkable to pleasure from the idea we can think it (this is the movement broached in §24 and countered to the restfulness that the beautiful gives us). The pain quickly moves to pleasure—he calls this akin to a vibration that propels us between repulsion and attraction. We overcome the lapse in ability of our imagination to think the unthinkable and make it start working (even, implicitly, when the answer cannot be had, we still can begin to think it). “The transcendent (towards which the Imagination is impelled in its apprehension of intuition) is for the Imagination like an abyss in which it fears to lose itself; but for the rational Idea of the supersensible it is not transcendent but in conformity with law to bring about such an effort of the Imagination, and consequently here there is the same amount of attraction as there was of repulsion for the mere Sensibility” (§27, p.72). However! Even though reason kicks in, the judgment remains aesthetic because it has no determinate concept of the object by which to judge as if it were a question of understanding. It is precisely because of a conflict between Imagination and Understanding that shows this to be a subjective play of the imagination (a matter of aesthetics, a judgment of taste through the faculty of desire, not a cognitive judgment). This is also its difference from the Beautiful, wherein it is harmony between Imagination and Reason that elicits pleasure. The eliciting of pleasure in both, in conflict for the sublime and harmony for the beautiful, is what shows them to both have subjective purposiveness: “That is, they bring about a feeling that we possess pure self-subsistent Reason, or a faculty for the estimation of magnitude, whose pre-eminence can be made intuitively evident only by the inadequacy of that faculty [Imagination] which is itself unbounded in the presentation of magnitudes (of sensible objects)” (§27, p.72-3). B.—Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature: §28 “Power is a capacity that is superior to great obstacles. The same thing is called domination if it is also superior to the resistance of something that itself possesses power. Nature considered in aesthetic judgment as a power that has no dominion over us is dynamically sublime.” It must be represented as arousing fear. (Although, not everything that arouses fear is sublime). “…for the aesthetic power of judgment nature can count as a power, thus as dynamically sublime, only insofar as it is considered an object of fear.” Be can consider the object fearful without being afraid of it (i.e. fear God without being afraid of him). Someone afraid cannot judge about the sublime in nature just as someone feeling desire cannot judge about the beautiful. When the fear or the troublesome resides, the result is joyfulness. This joyfulness which comes from the liberation from danger is requires one to not be afraid again nor think back but reluctantly on it, and never seek it out again. “Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightening and crashes of thunder, volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty river, etc., make our capacity to resist into an insignificant trifle in comparison with their power. But the sight of them only becomes all the more attractive the more fearful it is, as long as we find ourselves in safety, and we gladly call these objects sublime because they elevate the strength of our soul above its usual level, and allows us to discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature.” We find our own limitation in the immeasurability of nature and the insufficiency of our capacity to adopt a standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of its domain. Nevertheless, we find also in our faculty of reason another nonsensible standard that has that infinity under it and by it finds all else small, therefore, finding in our own minds a superiority over nature itself even in its immeasurability. So—in this way, in our aesthetic judgment nature is judged as sublime NOT insofar as it arouses fear, but rather because it calls forth ur power (which is not part of nature) to regard those things about which we are concerned (goods, health, and life) as trivial. Thus, nature is called sublime here in that it raises the imagination to the point of presenting those cases in which the mind can make palpable to itself the sublimity of its own vocation even over nature. This feeling is not diminished by the fact that we must feel safe in order to arouse this satisfaction of sublimity. Even war has a sublimity to it. Religion sometimes has a sublimity, but only if we are not shaking in fear about God, if we are calm—not in the grasp of superstition—can religion be sublime. §29: “On the Modality of the Judgment on the Sublime in Nature” The Beautiful is universal and we assume others will see X as such without erring much. The Sublime, on the other hand, will not find such ready acceptance from others. “For a far greater culture, not merely of the aesthetic power of judgment, but also of the cognitive faculties on which that is based, seems to be requisite in order to be able to make a judgment about this excellence of the objects of nature.” The disposition of the mind to the sublime requires the mind to be receptive to ideas. “In fact, without the development of moral ideas, that which we, prepared by culture, call sublime will appear merely repellent to the unrefined person.” BUT—this feeling of the sublime is NOT given by culture, it has a foundation in human nature. This is the ground for the necessity of the assent of the judgment of other people concerning the sublime to our own. If a person cannot judge the Beautiful we say he has no taste; likewise, someone unmoved by that which we judge to be sublime we say he has no feeling. We demand both taste and feeling in cultured people. This demand relates the aesthetic judgment to moral feeling [we require taste b/c in it the power of judgment relates the imagination to understanding as the faculty of concepts; we require feeling b/c it relates the imagination to reason, as the faculty of ideas. We require feeling only under a subjective presupposition of the moral feeling in the human ascribing this same necessity to this aesthetic judgment]. “General Remark on the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgments”In relation to the feeling of pleasure, an object is considered either: agreeable, beautiful, sublime, or absolutely good. (this is a long summary of all these points). Summary: “We may describe the Sublime thus: it is an object (of nature) the representation of which determines the mind to think the unattainability of nature regarded as a presentation of Ideas” (§General Remark, p.80). That is, the sublime is that which overwhelms the rational capacities of the mind, temporarily freezing the mortal in awe and fear, before his apparatus reignites and grants a pleasurable overcoming of sensation by rational comprehension. The dynamic sublime is illustrated as the violent storm at sea, so fierce, man stands paralyzed at its display of incomprehensible force, before affirming himself as safe. Awareness of his safety results from his capacity to rationally distance himself from the danger and grants him ecstatic power over its ferocity. Examples: “… Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightening and crashes of thunder, volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty river …” (§28) and war and, occasionally, religion. The mathematical sublime is “… that in comparison with which everything else is small” (§25). “The estimation of magnitude by means of concepts of number … is mathematicsl; but that in mere intuition (by the measurement of the eye) is aesthetical” (§26). In the experience’s immediacy, one is incapable of assigning a concretion to the infinite or counting the miles or minutes of its depth. “Nature is therefore sublime in those of its phenomena, whose intuition brings with it the Idea of their infinity” (§26). But, then, one’s reason reawakens; one steps back and measures the scene in front of him/her as the power of knowledge pleasurably overcomes the previously un-fathomable magnitude. Examples: illustrated as a ravine cut across the earth, so deep, man stands aside it, overwhelmed by vertigo. Approaching Pyrimids in Egypt; St. Peter’s in Rome (§26) “We hence see that true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the [subject] judging, not in the natural Object, the judgment upon which occasions this state. Who would call sublime, e.g. shapeless mountain masses piled in wild disorder upon each other with their pyramids of ice, or the gloomy raging sea? But the mind feels itself elevated in its own judgment if, while contemplating them without reference to their form, and abandoning itself to the Imagination and to the Reason—which although placed in combination with the Imagination without any definite purpose, merely extends it—it yet finds the whole power of the Imagination inadequate to its Ideas” (§26). Overall, Kant’s sublime affirms that reason, philosophically, is the conqueror of passionate thinking, although, passion puts up a venerable fight.[1] Kant’s 3rd Critique, Analytic of the Sublime, §§30-54 (pp.90-136) In Short: Kant moves from the deduction of aesthetic judgments to communicability, common sense, interest we can take after the judgment, the communication art seems to speak, to the division of the arts, and the genius (required to make art Beautiful). The Deduction: §30 explains that we need a deduction to find an a priori principle by which to judge in the Beautiful, not the Sublime (in which the exposition gave us as much of a deduction as we can hope for since it is formless). §31 judges only pleasure or not; not the cognitive. It is just the singular judgment that properly expresses the purposiveness of the form that serves as universal (this universal is not to be counted, but presumed; it is justified by the autonomy of the subject’s judgment about receipt of pleasure or no and is not derived from any concepts). To resolve these oddities (that the judgment is a priori and not from any concepts) is to do a deduction of aesthetic judgments. §32 judgment of beauty must have universal assent; beauty is not in the object as a property, but is in our feeling of pleasure or not from it in its judgment. §32-3: you must judge for yourself; there is no empirical ground for beauty, so others cannot logically convince you that X is beautiful nor are there any legitimate rules to follow by which to judge if something is beautiful. §34: the pleasure must be immediate. §35: Taste is subjective, not logical, it does not subsume intuitions under concepts, but seeks the harmony of Imagination and Understanding. §36: The peculiarity is how aesthetic judgments of Beautiful are synthetic and a priori. §37: Communicability, Common Sense, and Interest: The Language of Art: The Divisions of Art: The Genius: At Length: §30: “The Deduction of Aesthetic Judgments Concerning the Objects of Nature may not be Directed Towards that which we call Sublime among them, but only to the Beautiful” For aesthetic judgment (necessarily based on some principle a priori) to have universal validity (as required by one of the four moments of taste), it needs a deduction, i.e. a legitimation of its presumption if it concerns a satisfaction or a dissatisfaction in the form of the object. More specifically, if we are to judge something to be universal, this cannot be an entirely subjective, relative judgment; it must have something by which it can judge, and this something must not be dependent upon a person, a time, or a place. Instead, it must be a priori, that is, it must be a principle that is true before all subjectivity and relativity from experience. Otherwise, it would be something akin to a Kafka-esque trial where something is being judged according to always changing, unknown, subjective, or relative laws; we need fixity to law for it to have meaning as law. So, aesthetic judgment needs a deduction to justify how it can be determined as subjective yet universal. The judgments of taste that satisfy this legitimation concern the Beautiful in nature. Their purposiveness has its ground in the object and its shape, even if it doesn’t indicate the relation of the object to others in accordance with concepts for judgments of cognition, but rather only concerns the apprehension of this form as it shows itself in the mind to be suitable to the faculty of concepts and the presentations of them. (Remember that Beautiful considers form and the Sublime, the formless.) “Only the sublime in nature—if we make a pure aesthetic judgment about it, which is not mixed with concepts of perfection, as objective purposiveness, in which case it would be a teleological judgment—can be considered as entirely formless or shapeless, but nevertheless as the object of a pure satisfaction, and can demonstrate subjective purposiveness in the given representation; and the question now arises, whether in the case of this kind of aesthetic judgment, beyond the exposition of what is thought in it, a deduction of its claim to some sort of (subjective) principle a priori could also be demanded” (§30): The question, here: can we have an a priori principle in the sublime in nature? The answer: the sublime in nature is only improperly so called, and should properly be ascribed only to the manner of thinking, or rather to its foundation in human nature. For which the apprehension of an otherwise formless and nonpurposive object merely provides the occasion for becoming conscious of this—it is used in a subjectively purposive way, but not judged to be such for itself and on account of its form. SO—the exposition on the judgments of the sublime in nature was also their deduction. They have in themselves a purposive relation of the cognitive faculties, which grounds the faculty of ends (e.g., the will) a priori. Therefore, these sublime judgments are purposive a priori—this is the deduction, this is the justification of the claim of such a judgment to universally necessary validity. So—we only need to seek the deduction of judgments of taste. §31: “On the Method of the Deduction of Judgments of Taste” The deduction will justify the legitimacy of the judgment even though it is subjective universality (not the judgment of cognition—just the pleasure or displeasure in a given object). The deduction will explain the presumption of a subjective purposiveness that is valid for all and not grounded in any concept of the thing because it is a judgment of taste. We do not have a judgment of cognition nor a theoretical judgment grounded in the concept of a nature in general through the understanding (cf., 1st Critique). We do not have a pure practical judgment grounded in the idea of freedom as given a priori by reason (cf., 2nd Critique). Instead, it is only the universal validity of a singular judgment, which expresses the subjective purposiveness of an empirical representation of the form of an object, that has to be shown for the faculty of judgment in general in order to explain how it is possible that something could please merely in judging (without the sensation of the senses or a concept) and that, just as the judging of an object for the sake of a cognition in general has universal rules, the satisfaction of one can also be announced as a rule for everyone else. This universality will NOT be grounded on a “countable” consensus. It will rest on an “autonomy of the subject judging about the feeling of pleasure in the given representation, i.e. on his own taste …” This universality will NOT be derived from concepts. SO—this judgment of taste has a two-fold peculiarity: -1- universal validity a priori yet not a logical universality in accordance with concepts but with the universality of a singular judgment. -2- a necessity, which must always rest on a priori grounds, which does not, however, depend on any a priori grounds of proof, by means of the representation of which the approval that the judgment of taste requires of everyone could be compelled. The resolution of these oddities, in which a judgment of taste differs from all judgments of cognition, will serve for the deduction: §32: “First Peculiarity of the Judgment of Taste” “The judgment of taste determines its object with regard to satisfaction (as beauty) with a claim to the assent of everyone, as if it were objective” (§32). Since statements like “this flower is Beautiful” have the assent of all, whereas the agreeableness of the smell will never have assent, we would think that the beauty must be a property of the flower, since each person has so many different sense tastes. BUT THIS IS WRONG. The judgment of taste consists in the fact that it calls a thing beautiful only in accordance with that quality in it by means of which it corresponds with our way of receiving it. Each subject must judge for himself, cannot rely on others’ experiences of the Beautiful to be convinced of the thing as Beautiful.[2] (i.e. cannot be imitation! A thing really does please universally! It must be a priori!) But, doesn’t an a priori judgment require a concept? (a standard? A concept of the object for the cognition of which it contains the principle?) No. A judgment of taste is not grounded on concepts, it is NOT a cognition, it is only an aesthetic judgment. §33: “Second Peculiarity of the Judgment of Taste” “The judgment of taste is not determinable by grounds of proof at all, just as if it were merely subjective” (§33). —1— Cannot follow others’ beliefs about taste to convince self of beauty. There is no empirical ground of proof for forcing judgment on anyone. —2— Cannot follow rules to convince self of beauty. It is not a judgment of understanding or reason, it is a judgment of taste, and this cannot follow grounds of proofs, or determinate rules. The judgment of taste is always made as a singular judgment about the object. The understanding can make a universal judgment by comparing how satisfying the object s with the judgments of others, but this is a logical judgment, not a judgment of taste. But, of course, the peculiarity is that this subjective judgment of taste makes a claim on all subjects. §34: “No Objective Principle of Taste is Possible” “By a principle of taste would be understood a fundamental proposition under the condition of which one could subsume the concept of an object and then by means of an inference conclude that it is beautiful. But that is absolutely impossible” (§34). Impossible because I must be IMMEDIATELY sensitive to the pleasure in its representation, not talked into it by proofs. §35: “The Principle of Taste is the Subjective Principle of Judgment in General” A judgment of logic: subsumes a representation under a concept of the Object A judgment of taste: does not subsume a representation under a concept of the Object If a judgment of taste did do so, then we would be able to work out the ‘logic’ of beauty and unravel the proofs or hard and fast rules by which to judge it. This is not the case at all. “Taste, then, as a subjective Judgment, contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or presentations (i.e., the Imagination) under the faculty of the concepts (i.e. the Understanding); so far as the former in its freedom harmonizes with the latter in its conformity to law” (§35, Bernard translation). That is, in order to judge, there must be some subsumption of representation under some principle, but, since aesthetic judgments are non-cognitive (they have no set principle by which to synthesize intuitions with concepts), they synthesize the faculty of Imagination with the faculty of Understanding so as to see how the former’s freedom harmonizes with the latter’s conformity to law. §36: “Of the Problem of a Deduction of Judgments of Taste” Kant begins with a paragraph summation of how knowledge is yielded in the 1st Critique (i.e., representations given as intuitions processed through a priori sensible structures of space and time and then synthesized with a priori concepts of understanding, the categories, to yield knowledge—more simply, this is essentially how knowledge begins in experience, but experience is gathered through innate structures made to receive it and process it into concepts of understanding, so, knowledge is from both experience and reason). The purpose of the 1st Critique was to determine if and how synthetic a priori judgments were possible, which would be the judgments we use in math and physics, where formulas can be known without any empirical data at all, but the actual completion of math problems requires us to use knowledge from experience. He wants to justify such knowledge that is both all reason and requiring experience because he wants to determine the possibility of making metaphysics a rigorous science—that is, be able to yield sure knowledge about that which we cannot directly experience, such as the existence of God, the beginning and end of us all, and the nature of our souls, these areas which we always think about, but cannot ostensively prove, like we can say here is the murder weapon… But, the perception of a representation (the ‘image’ you get from, are given by, things in the world) can give you a feeling of pleasure or pain and satisfaction, instead of a predicate (that by which we name something, e.g. a conceptual name/category), and this is the case for a non-cognitive aesthetic judgment. Even this non-cognitive has to have some a priori principle underlying it (as he has already argued in the previous six or so sections). So, the “problem” or “peculiarity” of aesthetic judgments is thus: “… how is a judgment possible, in which merely from our own feeling of pleasure in an object, independently of its concept, we judge that this pleasure attaches to the representation of the same Object in every other subject, and that a priori without waiting for the accordance of others?” (§36). This helps show that judgments of taste are synthetic, that is, they require and further knowledge by experience (in contrast, to say a rose is a flower is a given by the very definition of a rose—that is an analytical judgments—but, if you say this rose is lovely extends the judgment beyond the definition of the subject, the rose, and is, therefore, synthetic). But, at the same time (as he has established above) the principle by which we judge the beautiful, because this judgment must be universally presupposed for all others who judge, must also have an a priori aspect because it cannot be a radically subjective and relative judgment, it must have something true to it that does not depend upon experience. So, judgments of the Beautiful are synthetic a priori (just like those about math, physics, and metaphysics). §37: “What is Properly Asserted a priori of an Object in a Judgment of Taste” The pleasure we receive from the Beautiful is internally and immediately perceived. This contrasts to the pleasure one might receive from morally good actions, because there, the pleasure is the result of our obedience to a moral principle that can be empirically demonstrated. Not everyone will feel the same universal pleasure, from the beautiful, but will accede to the “… universal validity of this pleasure …” (§37). So, when one says, legitimately, “… I find it beautiful …” then one must “… attribute this sensation necessarily to everyone” (§37). §38: “Deduction of judgments of Taste” What is the a priori principle that is not based upon concepts that we use to judge the aesthetic? It is the “… subjective purposiveness for the Judgment which we feel to be mentally combined with the representation of the object” (§38). It is the form of the beautiful that yields this rule. This is the same as the aforementioned harmony felt between Imagination and Understanding when viewing the object. “Remark” This deduction is easy, so says dear Kant, because it needs not justify any objective reality of any concept (we do not need to see if the painting of Mona Lisa really looked like her). We can, of course, make mistakes; one can declare it beautiful when one has not approached it disinterestedly (instead, thinking, hmmm… that would match my couch, that would be useful to hang my hat on, that could make the neighbors like me); this does not destroy the legitimacy of the necessity of universality, it simply shows a mistake has been made in judgment by an individual. The object could, really, be beautiful, but the judgment was mistaken because it was undertaken improperly. §39: On the Communicability of a Sensation If our audience has the same sort of senses as we do (so far as we can presume this to be the case, if in a deaf community and you are not deaf, then obviously there is a disjunction between your senses and theirs, but, if in a crowd that all seem capable of hearing, and you are, too, then you can presume uniformity of capacity of sense), then we ought to be able to (and must assume so) that we can communicate our judgment of taste to others and they can likewise judge it to be the case. This, for aesthetic judgments, functions differently than how it does for moral actions; do not confuse the two. For a moral judgment to yield pleasure, you must know you are in accord with the good; for an aesthetic judgment, it must simply yield mere pleasure, you do not compare it to something conceptual or empirical. §40: Of Taste as a Kind of Sensus Communis [common sense] This presumption that we must do that all others will judge in likewise manner and feel likewise pleasure from the Beautiful establishes evidence for some sort of a “common sense” amongst subjects. Sense has no capacity for giving some set of rules for this commonality, but we presume and assume it every time we make aesthetic judgments. §41: Of the Empirical Interest in the Beautiful We must judge with no interest, but, then, after the judgment, there is no prohibition to going on and considering the empirical interest of a thing. Judge first, sans interest, then you can think about how it can profit you, satisfy you, etc., but these latter are not further aesthetic judgments of the Beautiful, but are other sorts of judgments (aesthetic of the Good or Pleasant, or cognitive about other aspects therein, e.g., ‘my, how the town in this picture has changed since then!’). §42: Of the Intellectual Interest in the Beautiful Further, on relation of morally good to the beautiful {think about Pseudo-Dionysius’ high rank given to the divine names Good and Beautiful or Plato’s almost perfect equation of these as the Forms}. For Kant, however, the connoisseurs of the Beautiful are not in kind to the connoisseurs of the morally Good! The former “… not only often but generally, are given up to idle, capricious, and mischievous passions …” (§42), unlike the latter, who strive for moral correctness. But … maybe they aren’t entirely distinct, the Beautiful and Good, that is … So, he further distinguishes that the interest in the Beautiful of Art can lead to the idle, but the interest in the Beauty of Nature is the “mark of a good soul” (§42). “This superiority of natural to artificial beauty in that it alone arouses an immediate interest, although as regards form the first may be surpassed by the second, harmonizes with the refined and well-grounded habit of thought of all men who have cultivated their moral feeling” (§42). The charms in the Beautiful of Nature are often: blends and modifications of light (color) and/or sound (tones). “… they involve in themselves as it were a language by which nature speaks to us, which thus seems to have a higher sense” (§42). Kant’s examples:
All of these seeming expressions of meaning from Beauty in Nature make us think that there is design therein—even if/though there is not, at least in the judgment (hence, purposiveness without purpose). But… this sense vanishes as soon as we recognized we are deceived, that there is no purpose, ‘it is only art’ … this awareness of artificiality destroys the charm of art. §43: “Of Art in General” With §43 Kant focuses directly on FINE ART as opposed to Natural Beauty: The Definition of Fine Art: All action whatsoever “Doing” / “Making, ” Natural Effects art in general Skill/Practice Knowledge/Theory Free of Externally Craft/Mercenary labor Determining effects (e.g. Pay) Freely pleasurable “Mechanical,” mere production (aesthetic, §51) based on definite concept, not directed toward feeling. Fine Art Agreeable In defining Fine Art, Kant moves from the most general distinction (top) to the most specific (bottom) distinguishing on each level what is art (on left) and what is not art (on right). What is not art is other purposive action, just not fine art. This clarification partially duplicates the results of the four moments of the Beautiful (for example, disinterestedness and concern with mere form). Any doing or making requires the existence of a concept of a purpose—of that which is going to be made. The key difference between beauty in art and beauty in nature is the existence in the former of a concept of a purpose. How this works, how a concept of a purpose can be involved, yet it still be aesthetic is uncertain. To solve this, Kant introduces the idea of the Genius. Genius is the talent founded ultimately on a priori faculties of the human and thus, founded in nature. This talent creates the utterly original material for fine art (which for this reason appears natural in the sense of not drawing attention to its artificiality), which exceeds and encompasses its purpose, and then (as a secondary occupation), “expresses” this material into a beautiful form. §43: “On Art in General” [There are three arts distinguished]: (1) Art is distinguished from Nature as Doing is from Acting or Producing in general. The consequence or product of art is Work (opus). The product/consequence of Nature is an effect (effectus). Only production through freedom (through the capacity for choice that grounds its actions in reason) should be called art. The representation of it in its cause must proceed its reality, although it need not exactly have thought of the effect. An art is a work of human beings. Nature is not human work. (2) Art as human skill is not a science. An artist may have complete knowledge of how but not immediately have the skill. A scientist can do it as soon as s/he knows it. (3) Art is not a handicraft. Art is liberal. Handicraft is remunerative art. Art is purposive (successful) only as play (agreeable in itself). Handicraft is regarded as labor (disagreeable in itself and attractive only because of the effect (the remuneration) and can be compulsory. As Kant says, only production, the making of art, can be called art if it is done through freedom: the capacity for choice (CJ, 43). §44: “On Beautiful Art” --1—There is no science of the Beautiful, only a critique. --2—There is no Beautiful science, only Beautiful art. -A- If there were a science of Beautiful, then there would be proofs of beauty or not, thus, it would not be a judgment of taste. -B- If there were a Beautiful science, this is “absurd,” then tasteful expressions could not function as scientific proofs of ground. A Mechanical Art: is art adequate for cognition of possible object that merely performs the actions required to make it actual. This is contrasted to aesthetic art. Aesthetic Art: The feeling of pleasure is its immediate aim. This is divided into two divisions: Agreeable Art and Beautiful Art. Agreeable Art: The end is that pleasure accompanies representations as mere sensations. Beautiful Art: The end is that pleasure accompanies as kinds of cognitions. Agreeable Arts: Aimed at enjoyment, includes charms that gratify. Beautiful Arts: Representation is purposive in itself, without end, but promotes the cultivation of mental powers for sociable communication (it has social power). “The universal communicability of a pleasure already includes in its concept that this must not be a pleasure of enjoyment, from mere sensation, but one of reflection; and thus aesthetic art, as Beautiful art, is one that has the reflecting power of judgment and not mere sensation as its standard” (§44). §45: “Beautiful Art is an Art to the Extent that it Seems at the Same Time to be Nature” “In a product of art one must be aware that it is art, and not nature; yet the purposiveness in its form must still seem to be as free from all constraint by arbitrary rules as if it were a mere product of nature.” The feeling of freedom (in the play of our cognitive powers) is purposive and rests on the pleasure that is universally communicable. Nature was beautiful if it looked like art. Art is beautiful when we know it is art, but it still seems like nature. “…that is beautiful which pleases in the mere judging (neither in sensation nor through a concept).” Art always intends to production. If sensation or concept produced then this is merely a mechanical art, not aesthetic. The Purposiveness in the product of Beautiful art is intentional but must NOT seem intentional. In other words, Beautiful art must be regarded as nature even though one knows it is not. Art appears as nature if we find it to agree “punctiliously but not painstakingly with rules…” (The principle Kant is searching for here in §45 is the free play of the imagination). §46: “Beautiful Art is Art of Genius” Genius: the talent, natural gift, that gives the rule to art. “Genius is the inborn predisposition of the mind (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art.” Beautiful arts must be arts of genius. Every art presupposes rules that lay a foundation by means of which an artistic product is first represented as possible. These rules cannot have concepts as their grounds. Beautiful art cannot itself think up the rule by which it will make the art product. However, it must have a preceding rule so “nature in the subject” by disposition of its faculties must give rule to art. Genius is: (1) “… a talent for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given …” Genius is NOT predisposition of skill which can be learned by following some rules. Thus, the genius must have ORIGINALITY as primary characteristic. (2) The products of genius must be models/exemplars, not imitations. They must be standards, or rules for judging. (3) Genius cannot describe or indicate scientifically how it creates. Can only give the rules as nature. Thus, the author of product owes the idea and product to his/her genius. The author cannot tell or teach how to do it. (4) Genius nature ONLY proscribes the rule to Beautiful art (not to science or lesser arts). §47: “Elucidation and Confirmation of the above Explanation of Genius” Genius is opposed to the “spirit of imitation.” Genius is not learning or following rules. It is not like science. For Geniuses “… art somewhere comes to a halt, because a limit is set for it beyond which it cannot go, which presumably has also long since been reached and cannot be extended anymore …” What sort of rule is this that the gift of nature gives to art? It cannot be in concepts. The rule must be abstracted from the deed, the product, the model. §48: “On the Relation of Genius to Taste” “… an object’s being the representation of something morally worthy cannot of itself determine that the object is beautiful; nor can the object’s being a representation of something morally unworthy, or ugly or distasteful, entail that the object cannot be beautiful. On the contrary, fine art can describe beautifully ‘things that in nature would be ugly or displeasing’ (CJ, sec.48, 312), including such ‘harmful’ things as disease and the devastations of war” (p.19, Bernstein). §49: Of the Faculties of the Mind that Constitute Genius When something is Beautiful, we say that it has “spirit,” beyond just technical precision or general agreeableness. Spirit: “… in an aesthetical sense, is the name given to the animating principle of the mind. But that whereby this principle animates the soul, the material which it applies to that [purpose], is that which puts the mental powers purposively into swing, i.e. into such play as maintains itself and strengthens the [mental] powers in their exercise” (§49). This principle of “spirit” is “no other than the faculty of presenting aesthetical ideas. And by aesthetical idea I understand that representation of the imagination which occasions much thought, without however any definite thought, i.e. any concept, being capable of being adequate to it; it consequently cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by language” (§49). Imagination (the free play by laws of association) excites in us and makes us feel freedom—the freedom to take up the materials of nature and make them into something that surpasses nature. By imagination, we quest after a maximum; we seek to go beyond the limits of experience so as to present a sense of completeness which can never be found in nature itself (and this is the art of the poet, most properly speaking). The truly creative imagination undergirds its representation of the imagination a ‘concept’ belonging to its presentation (thus, one given to itself by itself, hence no rational concept), thereby aesthetically enlarging the concept (synthetically) in an unbounded way. The creative imagination brings ideas (the intellectual, “Reason”) into movement … i.e., creativity ignite and activates Reason (not the other way around). The creative imagination gives matter to thought, more matter than is ever occasioned within a concept or thought alone … there is always herein a surplus … the art “says” more than can be said, it presents more than can be ever represented. §50: §51: §52: §53: §54: §55: §56: “Representation of the Antinomy of Taste:” An “antinomy” is a paradox, or two set of beliefs, each of which seems true. In his “antinomies,” Kant works out critiques or conflicting assertions. The first “antinomy” is the idea (which he disdains by naming that which “every tasteless person proposes to avoid blame,” i.e., we say this just to not be called wrong or to meanly judge another as wrong): “everyone has his own taste” (§56). This, he simply dismisses out of hand here … his explanation as to why is built by everything up until now that we have read. The second “antinomy” is the idea that “there is no disputing about taste” (§56). This position, he says comes from those who will grant that taste is not merely subjective, i.e., wholly relative, but, still, that while there is right and wrong, there is no firm determining ground by which we can judge because there are no ‘concepts’ like objective real, external facts. In between these two antinomies, he points out, we actually make another claim that bridges them together: “there may be a quarrel about taste” (§56). This counters the first claim; it is incorrect to suppose that there are any (rational or logical or sensible) grounds for quarreling if taste is so radically private that each has his or her own. Nevertheless, despite the contradiction, those holding the first claim often presume this third intervening point. This third point also allows us to then soften the austerity of the first (and presumably thereby strengthen the position) and adopt the second claim. The second claim says there is no objective criteria by which to judge, thus no reason to fight over taste. Obviously, to say there is no need to fight presumes that there is a possibility by which we could fight. He then concludes the section by setting up claim one and two as the counter positions (the thesis and its opposite, the antithesis). §57: “Solution of the Antinomy of Taste” These two competing claims are irreconcilable unless we see that they are using the term “concept” differently. Kant then clarifies the subtlety of his claim that aesthetic judgment does NOT rely upon concepts, but actually provides itself with its own. Remember … the guiding project of the third critique had to answer this question. That is to say, when we are thinking about knowledge in general, we use Understanding, for which, judgments are determinate (they have concepts to subsume particulars under). When we are thinking about aesthetics, which is about taste, thus distinct from knowledge in general, we confront the problem of how does judgment judge? Judgment cannot be determinate here; aesthetics has no concepts. So, how does judgment judge without a concept? Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment asks: does aesthetics’ Reflective Judgment give itself an a priori principle? And answers, “YES!”—it gives itself an a priori principle via Reason of the Purposiveness of Nature (which remains without purpose). In aesthetic judgments, we judge via the Accordance of Form (related by the imagination) to the Cognitive Faculties, wherein “form” is considered a ground of pleasure that comes from the representation. (Refer back to the opening introduction to his “critical project,” above, for this explanation). So, in this section, Kant is clarifying how the judgment must refer to some concept (because it is a universal judgment), BUT it is not deduced from any concept (because it is subjective, hence cannot be objective, which would dictate it would be determinate or unknowable). Like with knowledge in general, this process must refer sensibility to something, but, in aesthetic judgments, this is not done so as to determine their concept for understanding. (Again, because it is subjective, that is, we “know” a judgment of the beautiful has been correctly made be WE who judge FEEL pleasure, and, obviously, an object cannot feel your pleasure for you.) So, in this very particular way, each feels his or her own pleasure as a result of his or her own correct judgment of the beautiful … note, this is like the first antinomy. “Nevertheless there is undoubtedly contained in the judgment of taste a wider reference of the representation of the object (as well as the subject), whereupon we base an extension of judgments of this kind as necessary for everyone” (§57). So, while subjective, aesthetic judgment is also universal. But … to be universal, there must be reference to some concept! This concept cannot be intuitable, we cannot “know” it, thus, it cannot prove our judgment. What is this, then? “Such a concept is the mere pure rational concept of the supersensible which underlies the object (and also the subject judging it), regarded as an object of sense and thus as phenomenal” (§57). In other words, what in the world could possibly be capable of being a concept of the beautiful? Nothing, really, that we could name/sense in the world, thus, it must be a super-sensible concept (which you can read as supra-sensible, above or beyond that which we can sense) … a mysterious something other-worldy or spiritual or transcendent or just wholly other than the sensible. But! Here is the key: in judgments of taste, it seems as if we have phenomenal proof (proof that manifests itself to us) of what cannot be sensibly manifested! Now, obviously no court of law or scientific lab or a passerby in the street would accept this “evidence” outside of the realm of talking about matters of taste. (As Kant says is: “the judgment of taste is based on a concept … from which, however, nothing can be known and proved in respect of the object, because it is in itself undeterminable and useless for knowledge” (§57), which, we already really knew … remember, in aesthetic judgments we are disinterested, we don’t pay attention to whether the portrait is of a real person or one made up, that is “not the point” of art!) So, this aesthetic concept is ONLY valid within aesthetics and is GIVEN BY the activity of aesthetic judging. So, the evidence comes from itself and applies only to itself (which is how it evades becoming something rational or logical). Nevertheless, the fact that it happens piques the curiosity of Reason. Reason sits up and takes notice. (Wouldn’t you? Seeming phenomenal proof of what cannot be sensed? That is intriguing!!) What does this supersensible concept seem to be? “… its determining ground lies perhaps in the concept of that which may be regarded as the supersensible substrate of humanity” (§57). Aesthetics seems to tell us some much bigger truth about that mysterious uniting something-or-another of all humanity … it piques a metaphysical curiosity! But … now we get back to what we are doing … solving the antinomies (the one who says beauty in the eye of the beholder and the other who says no, but still we can’t fight over it). “The solution of an antinomy only depends on the possibility of showing that two apparently contradictory propositions do not contradict each other in fact, but that they may be consistent, although the explanation of the possibility of their concept may transcend our cognitive faculties” (§57). So, side one and side two seem to contradict, but don’t. Why they don’t is because there IS a concept to which aesthetic judgments refer (so taste is not radically relative), BUT this concept is supersensible … it is beyond what we can know, although, not knowing does not mean that there cannot be better and worse answers, just as in all matters of reason (e.g., sure, one can say that there is no First Cause, be it God, evolution, or a magical cat, but logically it is pretty impossible to explain an effect without a cause, and, even further, it is pretty clear that my magical cat theory is really weak compared to those of God and evolution!). Sure, there is no determinate concept, an absolute right and wrong, but there IS an indeterminate concept upon which aesthetic judgments are based, and the indeterminate allows for better and worse debates … someone follows the rules of the game well, or does not follow them at all, the latter is just wrong then, in accordance to the game as we can explain it! §59: Of Beauty as the Symbol of Morality: Now, because we have piqued the curiosity of Reason, and Reason is what is at play in metaphysical and moral thinking, we have an intimate link drawn between aesthetics and morality. “Intuitions are always required to establish the reality of our concepts” (§59). The intuitions of empirical concepts are called examples; The intuitions of pure concepts of Understanding are called schemata. Theoretical cognition cannot establish the objective reality of ideas (rational concepts), for no intuition can be given that would be adequate to them. Presentation, called hypotyposis, sensible intuition, is either schematical (when a corresponding intuition is given to a concept comprehended by the understanding) or symbolic (when a corresponding intuition cannot be adequate to a concept thinkable only be reason, instead is given an intuition merely analogous to the rule of the procedure, and not to the intuition itself, thus, given to the form of reflection alone, and not its content). The symbolic is a mode of the intuitive, not its opposite. “… [T]he beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and that it is only in this respect (a reference which is natural to every man and which every man postulates in others as a duty) that is gives pleasure with a claim for the agreement of everyone else. By this the mind is made conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above the mere sensibility to pleasure received through sense, and the worth of others is estimated in accordance with a like maxim of their judgment” (§59). Discussion Prompts: (1) Sublimity: explain any one of Kant’s following points about the sublime, and then search for and select any example of art (any medium, please upload file or include a link to it on the internet) that you think illustrates his point and explain how. Points to select from (cf., §23 ff): the sublime is formless but it invokes totality; the sublime’s satisfaction is bound up with quantity; the sublime yields a negative pleasure; or the sublime seems to violate our sense of purpose in judgment, thereby doing violence to imagination. (2) Universality in Beauty: Explain (for Kant) and evaluate (personally) what follows from speaking “this flower is beautiful” (§32). (3) Genius: According to Kant, you cannot learn to be an artistic genius, genius is no set of skills, but some sort of originality. While describing Kant’s genius, argue whether or not you think truly beautiful art can only be produced by genius. Does the pure originality of genius violate his theory that there is a common sense to which beauty speaks? Do we truly like wholly original art, or is it dangerous (in another section of the 3rd Critique, Kant writes that we must “clip the wings” of the genius (§50)), somewhat like what Plato argued? [2] “Taste makes claim merely to autonomy. To make the judgments of others into the determining ground of one’s own would be heteronomy” (§32). Comments are closed.
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Dr. Walton's Notes on the Course ReadingsClicking on the appropriate button listed below will take you to posts with summary and analysis for each of our course readings: |